Tag Archives: philosophy

July 28, 2015

Biesta (2014) risk of education

Biesta, G. (2014). The Beautiful Risk of Education. London: Paradigm Publishers.

The beautiful risk of education (2013) adds to ideas Biesta presented in his previous books Beyond Learning (2008) and Good education in an age of measurement (2010).  Biesta maintains that schooling has three aims: socialization, qualification and subjectification (i.e. becoming a subject). In this latest book, Biesta proclaims that education needs to embrace risk rather than reduce risk, and he discusses this with reference to creativity, communication, teaching, learning, emancipation, democracy and virtuosity.  Current educational policies aim to make education stronger, more secure, more predictable, and risk-free. However, Biesta asserts that policy-makers oversimplification of learning is potentially damaging and veer away from what education ultimately means. After all education is not a simple transfer transaction between machines. Education is a complex social-interaction between human beings and slow, difficult, out-of-comfort-zone learning that pushes boundaries is the powerful learning that sticks. Instead of seeking to reduce risk, education needs to embrace risk as an essential part of teaching, learning and schooling.

Biesta voices concern over the relatively recent paradigm shift from the traditional teacher as an authority to the constructivist teacher as a facilitator of learning.  Biesta interprets constructivism as a theory of learning not a theory of teaching, and he makes a clear distinction between learning from (leren van) and being taught by (leren aan).  A teacher should not be reduced to an agent that speeds transfer of knowledge from one vessel to another.  Teachers are essential in a learning environment to empower learners to reach beyond their immediate known grasp.  Biesta reminds us that we need to remain aware that teaching does not necessarily result in learning and indeed we cannot predict any of the effects of teaching.

Biesta also discusses teacher education. He declares teacher education has become over-simplified by structuring programs on narrow pre-defined competencies. To be qualified to teach, learner-teachers merely demonstrate achievement of separate competencies. Biesta sees it as insufficient to have knowledge and skills of separate parts of teaching because teachers must be able to perform multiple tasks in complex learning contexts with multiple conflicting factors.  Teacher education also provides a role modelling function so that learner-teachers become aware of the social expectations and shared traditions of teaching. It is this apprenticeship role within an active Community of Practice that Biesta values.  Biesta proposes an alternative to current competency based teacher education, that develops virtuosity and replaces narrow competencies with teachers’  judgements. Biesta states that learner-teachers can learn virtuosity by studying the virtuosity of others. But who is judged as being a virtuoso? Which contexts allow virtuosity to be seen?

July 28, 2015

Williams (2012) Karl Popper

Williams, L. (2012). Karl Popper, the enemy of certainty, parts 1 – 5. The Guardian.

Karl Popper (1902-1994), a philosopher of science, sought to explain how scientific theories could be verified as true. As a teenager, Popper was attracted to the irrefutable explanations of Marxist ideology; however, he grew to oppose these unfalsifiable claims. Throughout his adult life, Popper supported political moderation, tolerance and liberalism, and furthered understanding of politics, scientific methods, and epistemology (the part of philosophy of that deals with knowledge). Popper’s ideas are now commonly incorportated into research methods and are even considered common sense.

Popper disagreed with logical positivism and empirical science that verified ideas through experience and experiments. As patterns and theories became evident, scientists appeared to look for further evidence to support (rather than refute) their case, with any exceptions being explained through additional subsidiary and ad hoc hypotheses.

Popper insists on falsificationism.  Regardless of how much evidence supports a theory, if one thing can disprove a theory, then the theory is not scientific. Popper asserts that exceptions prove that a theory is false, and that exceptions do not warrant additional explanation. Popper tolerates pseudo-sciences, such as psychology, because they do not make completely false claims, but instead stumble across interesting half-truths in non-scientific ways. Popper maintains that destructive testing is the only viable scientific method. He seeks refutation, and insists that confirmation too simple and feeble. The weakness in Popper’s demand for falsification is not theoretical, but behavioural.  In reality, scientists do not reject theories because of a single exception, which shows a weakness in a theory.

Kuhn sees Popper as too idealistic. Kuhn states that scientific theories are governed by ever changing paradigms, which have a constant core theory and changing subordinate hypotheses which are introduced and adapted as new evidence emerges. If a long held core theory is totally disproved, then a paradigm shift occurs. However scientists appear to hold on to theories even when evidence disproves them.

Lakatos holds a more refined version of falsificationism. Lakatos claims that rather than deliberate whether a scientific theory is true or false, the research methodology and methods should be examined to establish whether the research process is improving or deteriorating.

Feyerabend disagrees with Popper. Feyerbend protests that auxiliary ad hoc hypotheses are essential because science does not adhere to epistemic ideals nor fixed principles and methodological rules. Feyerabend proclaims that the truth can only be judged in relation a specific situation and context.